Bank of Salt Lake, A Utah Corporation, And Norton Parker, An Individual v. Globe Leasing Corporation, A Utah Corporation; Al Weigelt And Gloria Morrison, Individuals : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Bank of Salt Lake, A Utah Corporation, And
Norton Parker, An Individual v. Globe Leasing
Corporation, A Utah Corporation; Al Weigelt And
Gloria Morrison, Individuals : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Robert M. Anderson and Douglas Matsumori; Attorneys for
AppellantRobert M. McRae; Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bank of Salt Lake v. Globe Leasing, No. 15337 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/776
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah 
corporation, and NORTON 
PARKER, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellant, 
v. 
GLOBE LEASING CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; AL WEIGELT 
and GLORIA MORRISON, individuals, 
Plaintiffs-Respondent. 
Case No. 15337 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
------------------------------------
An appeal from a judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, Judge 
ROBERT M. ANDERSON 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
& McCarthy 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
LONI F. DeLAND 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attornef' f,r r:spr::2et:> 
JAN 2 3 1978 
-....--···-·····-···-··· .. -·-····· .. •-.....&ill 
Clerk, Sup,...• Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
OPENING STATEMENT . . . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION 
OF LAW THAT APPELLANT IS LIABLE 
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE RESPONDENT. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUP-
PORTS THE CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT 
APPELLANT TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH 
THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE RESPON-
DENT ..••.•......... 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON LOST 
PROFITS WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION 
OF THE LAW ...•..•....• 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT RESPONDENT SUFFERED $50,000.00 
DAMAGES IN LOST PROFIT AFTER COUNTER-
CLAIM LOSSES OFFSETS IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE 
EVIDENCE 
CASES CITED 
Page 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
10 
21 
36 
37 
Alward v. Paola, 179 P.2d 5, 9, 79 C. A. 2d 1 (1947). 34 
Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 
122 Wash. 220, 210 P. 366 (1922) 24, 25 
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). 30 
Chournos v. Evona Investment Company, 97 Utah 335, 
rehearing denied 97 Utah 346, 93 P.2d 450, 
453, rehearing denied 94 P.2d 470 (1939). 3 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Dunagan v. Appalachian Power Co., 33 F.2d 876 (1929), 
cert denied 50 s.ct. 152, 280 U.S. 606 . . . 34 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 
521 p. 2d 563 (1974) ..... 
Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 
17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P.2d 911 (1965). 
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 
11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018 (1961) 
Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt Lake, 
54 7 p. 2d 197 (1976) .•.... 
Gray v. Janss Investment Company, 196 Cal. 634, 
200 P. 401, 404 (1921) .•... 
Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co. ,(CA4 SC) 
107 F.2d 484, 131 A.L.R. 870, cert. denied 
309 U.S. 667, 84 L. Ed. 1014, 60 S. Ct. 608 
(1939) . • •..•.... 
Handley v. Guasco, 165 Cal. App. 2d 703, 
332 P.2d 354, 359 (1958) ... 
14 
12, I 
7' 
37 
23 
23 
Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 279 P.2d 354, 359 (1955). 23 
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 (1953) 23,. 
Legrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 
420 P.2d 615 (1966) • . . . . . 9, 
M~har v. General Motors Corp. (Appendix A) 
Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 (1945). 
Monter v. Kratzer, 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972) 
Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 
348 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644 (1954). 
Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 420 P.2d 611 (1941) 
Ramos v. Pacheco, 64 C.A.2d 304, 148 P.2d 704, 
707 (1944) . . . . . . . ........ . 
ii 
32 
30, 
24 
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. dba Randy's Datsun 
Sales v. Nissan Motor Corp. In U.S.A., 
533 F.2d 510 (1976) ••.•.••• 
Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co •• 
29 Utah 2d 409, 503 P.2d 850 (1972) 
Thomas v. Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975 (1928) 
u.s. v. Griffith, Gornan and Carman, Inc., 
210 F. 2d 11, 13-14 (1954) . 
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 
18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966) 
Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 52 C.A.2d 86, 
125 P.2d 840, 846 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Anno. §70A-9-502 (1977) 
Rule26(b) (4) (A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 688 
22 Am. Jur. 2d § 172, 173 (2d ed. 1964) 
25 C.J.S. § 42 (1966) 
32 C.J.S. § 546 (1966) 
86 C.J.S. § 43, 48 (1966) 
C.T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages (1931) 
l'l.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) 
APPENDIX 
A. Mahar v. General Motors Corp., unpublished 
opinion, 10th Cir. Ct. of Appeal on 
appeal from Fed, Dist. Ct. of Utah (1975) 
iii 
21, 22, 33 
35 
4 
21 
5 
34 
9, 12 
35 
35 
34 
21, 23 
24 
33, 34 
6 
34 
5, 7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Respondent accepts without reservation appellant's 
statement of the Nature of the Case and Disposition in Lower 
court. Respondent accepts appellant's abstract of the trial 
transcript in toto. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to expedite the review of this Court, respon-
dent will accept appellant's Statement of Facts with those res-
ervations pointed out in the Argument. Throughout the Argument 
this Court's attention will be directed to any facts taken out 
of context by the appellant and those facts which are misleading 
or are incorrect statements of fact or law. 
Respondent will also point out that appellant often 
relies on general rules of law as stated in secondary sources but 
has apparently neglected to read the cases annotated therein 
which creates distortion and misstatements of certain rules. 
Any statements or arguments of the appellant not speci-
fically challenged hereinafter are submitted to this Court on 
their own merits. 
- 1 -
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPELLANT 
IS LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE RESPONDENT. 
Appellant's Brief correctly states the rule of law 
in Utah (Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 (1945) as 
applied to the instant case. Respondent would iterate and em-
phasize one sentence therein " .•• A judgment in conformity with 
the findings will not be disturbed." 
Appellant asserts, inter alia, that one of the Court': 
Findings of Facts, i.e., that the bank impounded funds in Globe 
accounts at the bank, is not alleged in any of the causes of 
action set forth in the Complaint. Appellant, therefore, ignon 
count eleven of the first cause of action, "That the Bank of Sai· 
Lake failed to credit Globe Leasing Corporation's checking acco' 
for the proceeds of the three leases and that upon subsequent 
inquiry by the personnel of Globe Leasing Corporation, the reor' 
sentative of the defendant, Bank of Salt Lake, on or about July i. 
1974, advised plaintiff, Globe Leasing Corporation, that the 
leases would not be honored and that Globe Leasing Corporation 
account would not be credited with amounts representing proce~ 
of the three leases." It is certainly not inconceivable that 
the Court below found the actions of the bank, in effect seiz· 
ing the value of the three leases, tantamount to impounding 
funds belonging to Globe. 
- 2 -
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However, if appellant insists that the Court mistak-
enly had reference to the two accounts of Globe at the bank 
which were in fact frozen by the bank (cf Tr. 63, testimony 
of Mr. Weigelt and Tr. Vol. II 173, testimony of Mr. Stats) and 
overlooked that the impoundment of some $3,800 [sic] (Tr. Vol. II 
173) by the bank was not alleged in any of the causes of action 
included in the Court's Findings of Fact, appellant should be 
aware that such erroneous findings have consistently been held 
by this Court and the majority of jurisdictions to be but harm-
less error. 
Chournos v. Evona Investment Company, 97 Utah 335, 
rehearing denied 97 Utah 346, 93 P.2d 450, 453, rehearing denied 
94 P.2d 470 (1939), stands for the proposition that an erroneous 
finding by the Court below will not constitute a ground for 
reversal where, as here, appellant was not prejudiced thereby. 
The leading California cases on point go even further. 
In Gray v. Janss Investment Company, 196 Cal. 634, 200 P. 401, 404 (1921), 
the Supreme Court of California ruled that a variance in the plead-
ings and the findings which "could not have so misled or sur-
prised the defendants as to have placed them at a disadvantage ..• 
cannot be held to warrant the reversal of the judgment. 
Where a case proceeds upon the hypothesis 
that an issue has been raised and findings are 
made upon such an issue, the complaint becomes 
immaterial and judgment on the findings will 
be uoheld. (Citations omitted). A finding is 
not to be overthrown merely because it is more 
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specific than the allegation. Ramos v. Pacheco, 
64 C.A.2d 304, 148 P.2d 704, 707 (1944). 
The evidence before the Court below clearly demonstra'. 
that the bank could have been in no way surprised by the asserti: 
that they impounded Globe' s funds. The record shows that Globe': 
Motion to Release (those same) Im~ounded Funds was argued and 
a minute order entered on August 13, 1974 that the bank "place 
the impounded funds in a position to draw the highest interest 
available" (awaiting final disposition of the lawsuit.) 
The issue of the impounded funds in the two Globe accq 
was raised at trial considerably by both sides and, as in Ramos, 
is more specific than the Complaint. The significance of a few 
thousand dollars to the whole of the Findings and Conclusions 
is hardly significant and is not prejudicial to appellant's 
case. Appellant's assertion, therefore, if correct, is harm-
less error, and the other Findings set forth are sufficient 
to sustain the judgment. 
It is a well settled rule of law in Utah that error 
in the Findings notwithstanding, if there are other Findings 
which can sustain the judgment, then the judgment shall be sus· 
tained. That rule, stated by this Court in Thomas v. Foulger, 
71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975 (1928), has not been seriourly chal-
lenged. 
Appellant also argues that respondent's theory of 
recovery is "injurious falsehood" or "disparagement" as summar· 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ized by W. L. Prosser in his Handbook of the Law of Torts, 
§ 128 at 919 (4th ed. 1971) and cites two Utah cases as sup-
port of Prosser' s theory; Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 
644 (1954) and Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 
18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966). 
Respondent would point out to the Court that both 
Pender and Western States Title are slander of title actions. 
Pender can be distinguished from the instant case 
in that the defendant had a valid judgment for costs against 
the plaintiff. (emphasis added) 
His acts in having the execution issued, 
levying on the property and having it sold 
at sheriff's sale all reflected the true 
nature of the claim; that is, that these 
actions were taken to satisfy a judgment 
for costs .... (at 650). (emphasis added). 
The bank is now before this Court having actually dam-
aged the respondent's business reputation without benefit of 
legal process at the time of the injury. In the instant case 
the bank performed the various acts complained of thereby fore-
ing the other party (Globe) to resort to the courts. (emphasis 
added). The two cases are squarely in opposition. 
Western States Title, plaintiff and appellant, was 
denied relief by this Court: 
Unless we hold that the language claimed 
to constitute a libel is libelous per se, 
since plaintiff does not allege any special 
damages (therefrom) the ruling of the trial 
court cannot be reversed. (emphasis added). 
Globe alleged, and proved to the satisfaction of the 
lrial court, its damages. 
- 5 -
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Furthermore, respondent does not accept fully appel-
lant's proffer of Prosser as the controlling authority. 86 C.J.' 
§ 43 at 956 and 957 (citing cases) avers that wrongful interfer-
ence with prospective contracts or the right to pursue a lawful 
business, calling, trade or occupation has been "generally he~ 
to constitute a tort, ..•. Even though no wrongful or unlawful 
means are employed to accomplish the result .... " Prosser's 
"injurious falsehood" and "disparagement" theory has only been 
accepted in the courts of five states (New York, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, Illinois and Florida) on a limited basis and in only 
one Federal District Court (New York). 86 C.J.S. 48 at 971. 
Appellant addresses argument to tortious interference 
with contractual relations in Appellant's Brief at 14 which 
asserts, "Obviously, an element of that cause of action is inter· 
ference with some existing contractual relationship of the plain· 
tiff. Specifically the action is for inducing a party to breach 
a contract with plaintiff." Appellant is attempting to mislead 
this Court. As has been briefly mentioned, supra, the lost 
business profits prayed for in this action were those profits 
to be derived from prospective contracts over the years. The 
amount of loss which resulted from the interference with the 
existing sixty or so leases is miniscule as compared to the pro· 
fits to be expected in future years as estimated by Mr. Stuart. 
That area will be more thoroughly covered, infra. 
- 6 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant also argues at length that the Court below 
enumerated its Findings of Fact without any mention of the bank's 
purported privilege to interfere with the business of Globe. 
Appellant cites Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Association, 
11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018, 1022 as authority for the privi-
leged inducement of breach of contract. Again, we are not so 
much concerned with the breach of existing contracts as we are 
Globe's inability to continue in business and acquire additional 
contracts. The language in Gammon speaks to a different propo-
sition anyway, i.e., that the privilege spoken of is "an absolute 
right - that is, an act which a person has a definite legal right 
to do without any qualification." (emphasis added). 
The "qualifications" are apparent throughout the trial 
record. 
In the first place, the bank relies on after the fact 
knowledge to assert their so-called right or privilege. The 
bank's president at the time of the termination of the agreement 
with Globe, Mr. Parker, testified that the bank was not even 
aware of the "double financing matter" (Tr. Vol. II 128) until 
after the actions of the bank complained of herein. Nor could 
the bank have had any knowledge of the "forged lease" until 
some time after the funds were frozen (Tr. 151, 152). The 
bank surely does not rely on Globe's use of the "security de-
Posits" to assert its so-called privilege. Mr. Stuart testi-
fied without objection thereto that not only leasing companies 
- 7 -
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but also banks and "all types of businesses" traditionally and 
commonly use security deposits as working capital. For the bank 
then to assert that the conversion of deposits into working capi: 
is not good practice for a leasing company but is all right if 
you're a bank is disingenuous and self-serving. 
The strongest inference to be drawn from Mr. Parker's 
testimony is that the bank "pulled the plug," on Globe because 
Globe had grossly exceeded their lending limits and had underta\ 
too many leases with a company, Leisureamerica, which was not 
credit worthy (Tr. Vol. II 92 and 97). 
The tenuous nature of appellant's position on that 
matter is pointed out through the testimony of Mr. Perry, who, a: 
the time in question was the bank employee with the immediate 
authority to approve the Globe lease agreements. Mr. Perry tes· 
tified that the bank had final approval or veto power on all ere· 
dit applications of potential leases proposed by Globe (Tr. Vol. 
18 and 19) . The credit information was telephoned to the bank t: 
Globe whereupon they conducted their own "independent investigat 
About one third of the credit applications were not approved by 
the bank. Some of the applications might have gotten through 
without approval. However, there was nothing in the record to 
indicate anyone other than the bank was at fault for that. 
1. Since Globe had no control over approval of credi' 
how can the bank tortiously assert their "privilege" 
against Globe because the bank itself was the one 
who approved too much credit out through Globe accour 
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2. Likewise, since the bank had total control over 
credit approval, where is the justification for 
alarm over the numerous leases out to Leisureamerica? 
While respondent agrees there is basis for alarm, it 
is the bank and not Globe which appears from the record 
to be in need of policing. 
Further negating any privilege which might arise under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9 (70A-9-502 Utah Code Anno., 
1953) is the pure and simple fact that appellant could not prove 
at trial that Globe was in default on July 15, 1974 when appellant 
froze Globe's funds. The Court below specifically found no such 
default at the time the funds were frozen. 
Furthermore, in the case cited by appellant as the law 
in our state concerning the necessity for specific Findings of 
Fact upon all the material issues, Legrand Johnson Corp. v. 
Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966), this Court was 
faced with a very different and unusual decision. 
We are at a loss to understand why no findings 
of fact were made in the instant case. 420 P.2d 
616. 
This Court was disturbed that absolutely no Findings 
of Fact were presented by the trial judge. In the instant case 
the trial judge has enumerated seventeen Findings of Fact.That 
the Court was convinced no absolute right or privilege existed 
in the bank is implicit in the Findings. If the Court below 
chose to find such a privilege, the Court could have done so 
- 9 -
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since the privilege grows out of the same relationship the acts 
complained of arose from. Respondent asserts that by finding 
that the bank's acts were tortious the Court implicitly found no 
privilege because one did not exist. 
One additional attempt by appellant, in their (mis) StatE· 
ment of Fact, to attribute culpable behavior to Globe in order to 
justify the bank's tortious freezing of the Globe accounts should 
be briefly mentioned. In Appellant's Brief at page seven it is 
explained that the bank at first advanced credit to Globe on eact 
lease for the amount of each lease but that Globe later "changed I 
that practice" and began getting an additional 10% (Tr. 12-13, 41-l 
Vol. II 57, 123). Now who holds the cards here? As in the afore· 
mentioned credit approvals/investigations and the Leisureamerica 
leases it is the bank in the position to approve or deny and it 
is the bank who now comes before this Court and says "we did it 
wrong and now we want our money back." Further, a more careful 
reading of the trial transcript quoted above will reflect that 
Mr. Perry, albeit reluctantly, approved Globe's practice of adfo 
10% to the price of each lease. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE 
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPELLANT TORTIOUSLY 
INTERFERED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF 
THE RESPONDENT. 
As already pointed out above, the Findings of Fact 
are sufficient to support the Conclusions of Law in this matter 
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A. That the bank's actions herein complained of 
were sufficient to create the innuendo of lack of credit worthi-
ness is apparent from the record. Appellant's Brief at pages 18 
and 19 admits that Globe was not delinquent in any of its payments 
to the bank, then dismisses Globe's payment record as insub-
stantial in light of its use of security deposits as operative 
capital (a common 9ractice in the business according to the 
evidence); Globe's double financing of one automobile (a fact 
unknown to the bank at the time of their actions); the issuance 
of a forged lease (again, only known to the bank after the actions 
of July 15 and furthermore, the evidence did not inculpate any 
of Globe's employees or agents re the forgery); and Globe's 
thin capitalization (which was known to the bank before they 
extended nearly $400,000 in credit). 
The bank does not dispute that their actions put Globe 
out of business, i.e., created the innuendo and the atmosphere 
whereby Globe could not obtain further financing after having 
relied to their detriment on the bank. The bank merely alleges 
misconduct on the part of Globe after the damage is done. Re-
spondent submits that the bank merely panicked at the sight of 
so much money being out to one account, then set out to elimi-
nate that problem by eliminating the account itself, i.e., Globe, 
rather than policing the same and now comes before this Court 
and says, "yeah, but we were right after all." Respondents 
- 11 -
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do not deny the bank their right to correct their mistakes; 
however, the issue here is that in doing so, they don't cause 
injury to others as they have chosen to do here. 
It is not totally without significance that Mr. Parker 
may have never known about the abundance of Globe leases had 
he not observed a "very striking lady" (Mrs. Weigelt) and asked 
to see her file (Tr. 92). We are left to wonder whether or not 
Globe would be a flourishing business today if Mr. Weigelt's 
taste in women were not so good. 
B. Appellant again speaks of privilege and claims a 
statutory right (Appellant's Brief at page 19) to take the actior 
it did. In plain fact there is no such statutory right. Appel· 
lant mentions no statute; the record contains no such statute. 
If appellant is referring to Article 9 of the U. C. c. , respondent 
would stipulate that that is the test (70A-9-502 Utah Code Anno., 
1953); however, by appellant's own admission that the Globe accod 
were not delinquent, it is Globe and not the bank who should finci 
comfort with Article 9. 
Appellant cites Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and R~ 
Company, 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P.2d 911 as authority for its right 
to terminate an existing contract. A closer reading of that de· 
cision shows that Goodyear terminated its contract by giving 
thirty days' written notice pursuant to a specific term, para-
graph 14," of the contract. 
- 12 -
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If appellant relies on Flinco, then appellant impliedly 
relies on the written terms of each existing lease assignment. 
Exhibit 20-P to the trial transcript is one such representative 
agreement. Paragraph five sets forth default in payment, inter 
alia, as the basis for terminating the contract. Paragraph six 
is titled "REMEDIES" and directs the Secured Party to the u.c.c., 
inter alia, for redress for the default. 
After citing Flinco the appellant states that oral notice 
was given to Globe followed by written notice (telegram). In 
fact, the record is devoid of any such oral notification. 
Appellant makes a very strong argument that case law 
and the Utah Code Annotated allows appellant to terminate the 
agreement in question "at will" and without any default by re-
soondent. 
Appellant cites the language of 70A-l-208, Utah Code 
Anno., 1953 wherein appellant may so act "at will" or "when he 
deems himself insecure," etc. The Code also states in that same 
sentence of that same section •.. "(H)e shall have power to do 
so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of pay-
ment or performance is impaired." It is obvious that the court 
below found the element of good faith to be absent. 
Appellant believes Mr. Norton Parker's good faith can 
be found in his concern over the Leisureamerica leases (which, 
interestingly enough after all was said and done about their 
doubtful credit worthiness, the record reflects that Leisure-
america was not in default) ; the lack of bank authorization for 
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some leases (however, as argued previously, the bank's own for. 
bearance is not in any way attributable to Globe, Leasureamerici 
or any other entity other than the bank); and ~r. Parker's 
"belief" that someone at the bank was being "paid off" by Globe, 
This latter rather incredible accusation is not supported by 
even one shred of evidence at any point in the record and, in 
fact, there is no evidence that the bank believed the theory 
strongly enough to pursue the possibility of internal miscon-
duct. The bank allowed their lending to go unchecked and get 
out of hand, then came in attempting to point the finger at 
one of their own employees in order to justify closing down 
the respondent's business. 
Appellant cites First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Wright, 521 P. 2d 563 (1974) as a case being "directly on point" 
re lack of tortious interference liability for giving notice of 
one's security interest. Actually the case goes much deeper th;: 
that and supports respondent's position. 
First Security, on this issue, is a bifurcated decisic: 
(at 567) wherein Justice Crockett, writing for the majority, 
said: 
The first is that a creditor who has a 
security interest in personal property 
has a right to notify any third party 
of his interest; and doing so does not 
constitute an actionable interference 
with the debtor's business. 
Of course we know in this case we had more than mere 
notice of a security interest. We had intentional, affirmatl''' 
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acts by the bank which far exceeded the mere notice spoken of 
by Crockett, J. However, the stronger basis for the ruling 
seems to be that the defendant (Wright) : 
(D)id not make nor proffer any sufficient 
proof to justify a finding that he suffered 
compensable damage to his business as a re-
sult of First Security giving notice to the 
named debtors. 
Respondent has shown such proof of loss through its 
witnesses and the trial court accepted said proffer as the Find-
ings and Conclusions so indicate. 
C. In attempting to deny that the Bank's actions 
were the proximate cause of Globe's demise, appellant first 
asserts that Globe presented no evidence to show their ability 
to buy automobiles from automobile dealers was in any way dimin-
ished. The plain and simple fact of the matter is you can't 
buy cars without money to pay for them. Appellant's position is 
absurd with respect to that assertion. If Globe could have 
"borrowed" the cars they needed for their leasing business, 
they would not have had to seek financing from the bank in the 
first place. Appellant's comments about Globe's credit repu-
tation with such dealers "not (being) very good in any event" 
are self-serving and not relevant. Even if that were the case, 
you don't need credit if you pay cash ... and that was what 
Globe was doing before the bank withdrew its line of credit. 
Appellant also claims that there is no evidence that 
~urrent or prospective lessees refrained from doing business 
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with Globe. We suppose that is because there was no more Globe 
to do business with, i.e., the bank's actions put Globe out of 
business. If certain of the lessees were confused by the "clear 
language" of their lease agreements (Appellant's Brief at page 
27) it was only through the confusion brought about by the actio: 
of the bank. Appellant suggests in the Brief that perhaps the 
confusion was due to "some representation by Globe's Mr. Weigel: 
that, notwithstanding such language, he would not assign the 
leases." Such self-serving comments are not only not contained 
anywhere in the record--no such conduct by Mr. Weigelt was even I 
suggested at trial by appellant's counsel or appellant's wit- i 
nesses. 
As to appellant's claim that Globe had failed to show 
they could not obtain financing from other financial institution' 
after the bank's actions, one only has to wonder what bank or 
loan company will advance a loan to a company that has just had 
its line of credit taken away and has just been put out of the 
leasing business by another financial institution. When some-
one loses a leg due to a tortious act, the courts don't demand 
the victim try all of the hospitals to try to get the severed 
leg sewn back on before resorting to an action in tort. The 
irreparable damage had already been done. 
If, as appellant claims, the Bank of Salt Lake was 
the only place Globe could obtain financing and then the bank 
terminated Globe and then Globe necessarily went out of busi· 
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ness, it would only seem to make the issue of proximate cause 
more clear. Further, it is common knowledge that fledgling 
businesses build their credit reputation as they grow, buy and 
sell, and generally perform in the commercial world much like 
a young married couple builds their credit up through purchases, 
loans, etc. While it's true in July 1973 the Bank of Salt Lake 
loaned money to Globe when others would not, after one year of 
performing without delinquent accounts, with an increase of busi-
ness to include some 64 leases worth some $400,000 and a good 
overall "track record" as the expert witness, Mr. Stuart, testi-
fied (Tr. 220), it would seem that Globe's credit worthiness 
would have to have been enhanced considerably, if however, the 
bank had not pulled the rug out from under all that. The test 
is not whether Globe could borrow money after July 15, 1974, but 
whether they could have borrowed from another bank on July 14, 
1974. Aside from the one loan from valley State Bank, Mr. Weigelt 
never tried any other banks because the Bank of Salt Lake was 
taking care of all his needs. 
Mr. Stuart testified as a banking expert (Tr. 220) that 
he would have turned down ("recommended against") Globe's initial 
application to the bank but, based on perusal of the bank's 
records in dealing with Globe, Globe's dealings with its lessees 
and Globe's favorable eleven month "track record," he would have 
done so. Respondent submits that if other banks would have 
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financed Globe's operations on July 14, 1974, as Mr. Stuart 
suggested they might, they surely would not have done so on 
the following date. The evidence of that is implicit in all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the financial climate 
at the time as reflected in the record. 
Appellant attacks Mr. Stuart's credentials as an exper: 
witness referring to him as an "alleged" expert (at page 29 of 
Appellant's Brief), but respondent submits that Mr. Stuart is 
an extremely qualified expert in the areas of economics, banking 
and leasing as the record will reflect (Tr. 156-162). Mr. Stuar:r 
qualifications and testimony were obviously accepted and given 1 
great weight by the court below. 
At page 29 of the Brief appellant claims to have found 
Mr. Stuart giving contrary testimony at pages 209 and 220 of the 
trial transcript when, in fact, if taken in context, there is no 
such disparate testimony. 
Q: •.• do you have--have you formulated an 
opinion as to whether or not Globe Leasing, 
under the bank's financial situation that ex-
isted, the banking circles and lending cir-
cles in July of 1974, and with the action 
of the bank in claiming ownership of the 
leases and its entitlement to one of the 
security deposits, the accounts of Globe 
Leasing in the bank, and the directing 
or the mailing of the letters such as letters 
identified as 9P to Mr. Weigelt's customer, 
do you know of any conceivable way that 
Globe Leasing could remain in business? 
(Objections omitted) 
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A: No. 
Q: What is the import of cash flow to a 
company seeking a line of credit? 
A: Bankers rely heavily on the sources that 
are to be used to be paid funds that are 
advanced. If the bank can't see where 
it's going to obtain those funds, usually 
the loans will be denied. 
Appellant speaks of the disparate testimony contained 
in the trial transcript at page 220. A careful reading of page 
220 in its entirety shows no such testimony. Respondent would 
invite this Court's attention to pages 216 through page 222 
wherein Mr. Stuart explains in substance that he would have 
"been willing to back Globe" based on their track record were 
it not for the bank's acts in terminating Globe. At that point, 
Globe's good record was suddenly undone by the actions of the 
bank making another bank's extension of credit unlikely. Mr. 
Stuart's testimony throughout the record, particularly under 
cross-examination, was that he would have loaned money to Globe 
based on their eleven month "track record," i.e., the sum total 
of all the circumstances of the 64 leases but that no bank 
would loan money to Globe after July 15 in the face of the 
alleged defaults which the bank's actions implied. 
Appellant speculates there must have been some other 
reason for Globe's inability to obtain credit from other banks 
after July 15. Appellant posits other possibilities; viz., 
the banks were simply not interested in financing leasing corn-
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panies. All one has to do is look in the yellow pages 
under automobile leasing companies to discover the abun-
dance of said businesses. Somebody has to be financing 
them. Appellant cites Mr. Weigelt's testimony (Tr. 72-73) 
that he went to seven or eight banks to seek continued fin-
ancing for Globe (unsuccessfully) and only encountered com-
mon knowledge of the "Bank of Salt Lake matter" at two 
(to show, we suppose, that word of that matter really 
didn't get around the banking community.) We hardly ex-
pect a closed community like the banking circle to divulge 
such knowledge to Mr. Weigelt but we hardly doubt that 
such knowledge wasn't commonly held in the banking in-
dustry. 
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III. 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON LOST PROFITS 
WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE LAW. 
The older cases tended to exclude lost profits as being 
too speculative in nature. The recent cases, however, comport with 
the idea that . . . "the right to recover profits claimed to have been 
lost as a result of either a tort or a breach of contract is now 
determined by the same rules that govern the recovery of other dam-
ages". 22 Am. Jur. 2d § 172 at 242. The test for allowing lost 
profits as damages is: (1) their loss is proved with a reasonable 
degree of certainty; and (2) is caused by defendant's wrongful act;. Id. 
Two cases decided in Utah Federal District Courts, both ap-
pealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals are on point. In U.S. v. 
Griffith, Gornan and Carman, Inc., 210 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1954), the 
Court overruled an award of prospective lost profits because the plain-
tiff relied entirely on the testimony of its president who never pro-
duced the books from which he made his calculations. The Court af-
firmed the rule that: 
Prospective profits are necessarily somewhat un-
certain and problematical, but in cases where 
damages are definitely attributable to the wrong 
of the defendant and are only uncertain as to 
amount they will not be denied even though they 
are difficult of ascertainment. 
In Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. dba Randy's Datsun Sales 
v. Nissan Motor corp. In U.S.A., 533 F. 2d 510 (1976, the 10th Cir-
cuit upheld the award of $6000,000.00 lost profits (mostly future) 
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based on the testimony of an expert witness (coincidentally the 
same expert witness as in the case before bar, Mr. Stuart, usino 
the same "ten-year" method of computing damages). Over Nissan's 
argument on appeal, the court said at 517, 518: 
We are mindful that computations by ex-
perts cannot be based on conjecture or 
be unsupported by the record (cases cited). 
But, here, Stuart's damage calculations 
were based on records and data that were 
put into evidence through both testimony 
and exhibits, all of which were available 
to the jury during its deliberations. 
The court further stated at page 518: 
While damage claims (of lost profits) may 
not be speculative, they also do not have 
to be mathematically precise; it is suf-
ficient if damages are proved to a reason-
able certainty (cases cited). And, where 
the defendant's wrongdoing created ti1e"1lrl-
certainty, it must bear the risk of that 
uncertainty and cannot complain. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The rules of law cited by appellant in Howarth v. Ostei 
gaard, 30 Utah 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442 (1973) are correct; however 
respondent would point out that in Howarth, plaintiffs wanted to. 
use their mortgage as collateral for a loan from which they hope( 
to buy Christmas trees which they hoped to sell for a profit, a 
venture which plaintiffs apparently had not ever attempted in t:ii 
past. This Court correctly held that damages were too speculatr 
in that case. However, in the case at bar the "Christmas trees" 
were already established and capable of being projected into the 
future with reasonable certainty. 
A. APPELLANT HAS MISSTATED THE NEW BUSINESS RULE. 
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Appellant's argument regarding the so-called "new 
business rule" is without merit. 
Appellant argues that the "new business rule" precludes 
recovery in this case and cites, inter alia, 22 Am Jur 2d Section 
173 at 245. Appellant is referring to the following language: 
The general rule is that evidence of 
expected profits from a new business 
is too speculative, uncertain, and 
remote to be considered and does not 
meet ~he lrial standard of reasonable 
certainty. 
If appellant would have examined the cases cited in note 16 at 245, 
appellant would have discovered that virtually all of the recent 
cases cited in support of the above rule of law refer expressly to 
businesses "contemplated but not yet established" (emphasis added). 
E.g. Greenwood County V. Duke Power Co., (CA4 SC) 107 F2d 484, 131 
ALR 870, cert den 309 U.S. 667, 84 L.Ed. 1014, 60 S.Ct. 608 (1939): 
Handley v. Guasco, 165 Cal App 2d 703, 332 P.2d 354, 359 (1958): 
Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 279 P.2d 354, 359 (1955); Jenkins v. 
Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 (1953). 
In Jenkins this Court held • . . "prospective profits to 
be derived from a business which is not yet established but one 
merely in contemplation are generally too uncertain and speculative 
to form a basis for recovery" (emphasis added) . 
The 22 Am Jur 2d Section 173 annotation continues: 
If, in the particular case, it is possible 
to show, by competent evidence and with 
reasonable certainty, that profits would 
have been made and the amount of those 
profits, they can be recovered. 
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In at least one of the cases cited as authority for that languaq, 
Pace Corporation v. Jackson, lSS Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348 
(19SS), the business was not even established when the contract 
was made between the parties. A few months after the business 0, 
plaintiff was established, defendant withdrew from its obligaticr 
of supplying plaintiff with cigarettes at a bargain price. That 
court would go even further then than did the court in the inst~ 
case. 
Appellant also cites 2S Corp. Jur. Sec. Section 42 at 
197 in support of its position: 
New or Contemplated Business. Where a new 
business or enterprise is floated and dam-
ages by way of profit are claimed with re-
spect thereto, as for its interruption or 
prevention, they will generally be denied, 
for the reason that such business is an 
adventure, as distinguished from an estab-
lished business, and its profits are spec-
ulative and remote, existing only in anti-
cipation .•. on the other hand, lost 
profits will not be derived merely because 
a business is new if factual data are 
available to furnish a basis for compu-
tation of probable loss of profits. 
The same cases are cited as authority as were cited i:. 
22 Am Jur Section 173. 
Appellant also cites as controlling a Washington case. 
Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., et al., 122 was' 
220, 210 P. 366 (1922), a SS-year old case which is relied upon 
this Court in deciding Jenkins v. Morgan, supra. As this cour' 
aware, however, Jenkins stands for the proposition that prospe 
profits are too speculative when the business is only being co: 
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plated and is not yet established. 
Appellant's proffer of Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 
420 P.2d 611, 618 (1941) could not be examined because the cita-
tions are erroneous. 
Appellant's continued argument regarding the Carolene 
~ rule as to permanence and recognition of the business again 
relies upon the after acquired knowledge of the bank with respect 
to the "forgery", the double financing and the Leisureamerica 
leases. Respondent will not belabor the point with respect to 
appellant's tenuous reliance upon Globe's alleged "bad deeds" to 
show it was not a permanent or recognized business; the court below 
had the evidence before it and as the trier of fact that court 
apparently found the preponderance of the evidence to weigh in 
favor of the respondent on that issue. 
Appellant cites further examples of "proof" of Globe's 
lack of permanence at page 35 of its brief through the proffer 
of Mr. Stat's testimony (TR. Vol. II 173-178) concerning three 
leases. The first example given in the record, at 175, is a ve-
hicle which the bank repossessed in December, 1975, a full year and 
a half after Globe's termination; the second (at 176, 177) came 
back to the bank in May, 19 76 as per agreement in "super" condition; 
the third lease was terminated in April, 1976, a full twenty-one 
months after Globe's termination, due to an out-of-state licensing 
problem not attributed to Globe (at 178). Respondent fails to 
see what support appellant gains from the foregoing testimony. If 
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there were any problems with the individual leases we would sub-
mit that the bank's interference was the catalyst, at any rate. 
At page 35 of appellant's brief the assertion is made, 
"The testimony of Mr. Stuart concerning those leases was not, wi: 
the exception of the problem leases to Leisureamerica, based upc 
his appraisal of the soundness of any of the particular lessees' 
credit." We would again submit that it was the bank's duty by 
virtue of their own insistence to appraise the soundness of ead 
and every prospective lessee. It is up to the bank, and not Mr, 
Stuart to explain the folly of appellant's ways. 
Respondent argues further that appellant has not dis-
puted that Globe's record of collection was a good one, and subr.1 
that the only test appellant would seem to recommend would be an 
exact measurement of profits after said profits have been realiz 
Unfortunately, the bank's activities of July, 1974 preclude the 
eventuality of such calculations. 
Appellant attacks Mr. Stuart's credibility on yet anot·• 
point, i.e., that his background is entirely with "large and sue• 
ful" leasing operations operating as "adjuncts to automobile de,' 
ships" (at page 36 of appellant's brief referring to TR. 159-10 
189). There is absolutely nothing on those pages or anywhere d 
in the record to show that Globe's operation was not analogous· 
the operations Mr. Stuart was familiar with. In point of fact, 
appellant's counsel asked no such questions and produced no wi: 
nesses of his own to controvert Mr. Stuart's qualifications 01 
testimony. Counsel's closest intrusion in that area was to hd 
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Mr. Stuart agree that the previous operations within his knowledge 
were, "very well run," and had been in business, "quite a number 
of years" (TR. 189). 
Since appellant persists in arguing that Globe's per-
manence is suspect due to their meeting their demise upon termina-
tion of only one line of credit and, of course, the revival of the 
after the fact bad acts, we should point out one's memory does not 
have to be altogether perfect to recall that the summer of 1974 
was marked by extremely tight money in the financial sphere. Mr. 
Stuart's explanation (TR. 195, 196) of the "Federal Funds" barometer 
is very persuasive evidence of just how tight money was in the sum-
mer of 1974. 
B. THE AWARD OF LOST PROFIT WAS BASED ON COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
Mr. Stuart's calculations were valid and reliable and 
were based on sound standard economic statistical analysis. Mr. 
Stuart, to determine Globe's projected growth rate, compared 
the first six months' operation (an average of 3.2 leases per 
month) with the last six months' operation (7.5 monthly average; 
without Leisurearnerica, 5. 8 leases) (TR. 191). He testified that 
if that growth rate continued and was verified by linear correla-
tion and exponential smoothing, Globe would increase leases by 32 
leases annually, exclusive of Leisureamerica's leases (TR. 191). 
Mr. Stuart's expert opinion was that Globe's management 
and accounting were "excellent" and for a new business, particularly 
a leasing business with very little capital, "in all the business 
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evaluations I have made, this (Globe) was one of the better 
operations." (TR. 193.) 
Mr. Stuart prepared an analysis of profit and loss ~ 
a lessor leasing the same number of vehicles as Globe from avaii· 
able market publications and acceptable accounting methods and 
determined that the price Globe would be selling their leased ca 
for in the future would be consistent with market prices, theret 
keeping their bad debt expense very low, as would the releasing 
of repossessed automobiles (TR. 193, 194). He added that he di' 
not add that eventuality into his computations (Globe's possible 
releasing of automobiles) contrary to appellant's assertion at 
page 3 8 of appellant's brief that he did so without any evidence 
to support his method (emphasis added). 
Using "accepted economic and accounting principles", 
Mr. Stuart testified that he used a ten-year projection figure 
and stated why: 
There are a number of reasons why ten years 
was used. Ten years conforms to standard 
practice in valuation of using the ten-times 
multiplier of earnings. Ten years is also, 
when applied as a multiplier, the approxi-
mate amount of the discounted present value 
of stream of future receipts using exponen-
tial smoothing of cash flows. And, third, 
because the period of ten years has been 
sustained by courts as a reasonable period 
(TR. 213) . 
Mr. Stuart then explained to the court (beginning at 
TR. 214) that he prepared Exhibit 39P by using the aforementio~ 
ten-year projections vis a' vis "base year cash flow" and "ad]" 
men ts", e.g., he subs tr acted $15, 000. 00 from the positive side 
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the ledger as the estimate of Globe's losses on Leisureamerica 
leases and compared the same with the economic situation in the 
financial and automobile sales industry. He then observed that 
Globe's rate of growth (32 leases per year) could not be sustained 
so he reduced that number to what he thought Globe could sustain, 
i.e., ten new leases per year (TR. 215). 
The amount that attributed to the net 
cash flow associated with each new lease, 
after deducting my estimate of variable 
costs, was $600.00 per lease. That would 
represent the amount projected for 1975 
and 1976, and thereon. 
Mr. Stuart's estimate which he characterized as "conser-
vative" based on the evidence before the Court of Globe's operations 
as well as the rate of growth of other leasing companies within his 
knowledge, would be that Globe could expect about 164 leases ten 
years from their termination by the bank (had they, of course, not 
been terminated) (TR. 215). After discounting his figures by 6.29 
percent and making other observations about his computations (TR. 
215-216), Mr. Stuart estimated: 
The $225,704.00 would be my estimate of 
the damages because of the termination 
of the business of Globe Leasing (TR. 216) . 
That figure took into account payment of all "costs, expenses and 
salaries" (TR. 216). 
It is a long standing rule of law that it is the trier of 
fact who determines the credibility and reliability of witness tes-
timony. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at 
trial are entirely within the province of the jury, or, when tried 
by the court, within the sole province of the court. 
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There has been ample evidence presented by respondent 
to sustain the findings of the court below. The trial judge ha,_ 
the opportunity to hear the evidence, particularly the testimon; 
of Mr. Stuart, and determine its sufficiency. Appellant had th; 
opportunity to rebut and cross-examine, to call witnesses, exper 
or otherwise, and to present any competent evidence to con trove: 
the testimony of Mr. Stuart as to the computation of lost profi: 
and the projections of Globe's business future absent bank inte: 
ference. That the trial court believed there was sufficient ev 
dence from which to support a judgment for respondent is appam 
from the decision by that court. The court below is the judge· 
whether Mr. Stuart's computations were too remote and speculati' 
to be probative. The judgment speaks for itself. 
If there is substantial evidence to 
support the findings upon which the 
judgment is rendered, the judgment 
must be sustained. Charlton v. Hack-
ett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). 
The fact that it is difficult to cal-
culate damages will not prevent an in-
jured party from recovery. However, 
a judgment cannot be based on mere 
speculation. Monter v. Kratzer, 29 
Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40, 43 (1972). 
Appellant also cites Kratzer but omits the first oft 
above two sentences. In Kratzer, Ellett, J., writing for the": 
ity, held that future profits were speculative for a number oi 
sons. In the first place, there was no written agreement betwi 
the defendant-counterclaimant (supplier of bakery goods) and th' 
company (Continental Baking Company) to whom Kratzer was suppl 
the goods. This Court, in reversing the trial court's award 
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lost profits stated that although business with Continental had 
been ongoing for 17 years and had amounted to $5,000.00 per month, 
a recent management change at Kratzer had apparently started a 
steady decline in business to where, at the time of the inter-
ference, business was averaging only $2000.00 per month. 
There was no evidence to justify an 
inference that Continental would order 
$2000.00 worth of products from Kratzer 
(at 44) for ten years. 
In Kratzer it was stipulated that gross sales were 
$2000.00 per month. No evidence was presented to show daily sales; 
no expert witness was called to calculate by sound economic methods 
what projected profits would be. 
Respondent submits that he has met the burden of proving 
up those prospective damages as the court below so found. 
Kratzer was a business on the decline. Globe was a busi-
ness clearly on the rise. Appellant did not show any propensity 
for Globe to decline or even level off. The only evidence presented 
at trial at all probative of that was Mr. Stuart's expert "conser-
vative" opinion that Globe would increase their number of leases by 
ten per year for the ensuing ten years (TR. 215) . 
Appellant relies heavily on the decision of this Court 
in Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 
187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957) wherein future profits were denied a young 
attorney whose professional listing was omitted from the yellow 
pages of the telephone directory. 
This Court reaffirmed the rule of law in Utah as to 
future profits: 
- 31 -
1, 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The prospective profits were based on 
the speculative assumption that the 
potential clients lost through non-
referral would have resulted in the 
referral of other clients or business 
by the clients presumably lost (at 806). 
Respondent is clearly distinguished from Gould. This 
Court found that future profits based on referral was too remot; 
too speculative. There is nothing in the record to indicate tho 
Globe was relying on the double referral method of gaining new 
business. Mr. Stuart's calculations were based upon only ten ni 
leases per year (TR. 215). 
All this Court was asking in Gould was that future pli 
tiffs prove their prospective profits with reasonable certainty. 
In a 1975 case, Mahar v. General Motors Corporation, a 
unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals, 10'. 
Circuit, an appeal from the United States District Court for thE 
District of Utah (attached hereto as Appendix A) has gone even 
further in sustaining a verdict for prospective earnings of a 
college student who had been accepted to the University of Utah 
College of Law previous to having sustained the injuries sued u: 
The Court relied upon the testimony of an expert economist in 
fixing some $600,000.00 based on evidence of future earnings of 
practicing lawyer in the State of Wyoming (at page 12). 
Crockett, J., concurring with the dissent in ~ii 
favor of allowing future damages, provided us with the test to 
apply in determining whether the evidence will support an awaro 
future damages: 
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test. 
The traditionally accepted test of the 
law is that a fact may be found if minds 
may believe it by a preponderance of the 
evidence. This means that if it can 
reasonably be believed that it is more 
probable than not, or that it will with 
reasonable certainty occur, a finding 
of such fact is justified. (Citation 
omitted.) at 807. 
Respondent submits that the proof at trial has met the 
When damages are obvious but difficult to prove the 
wrongdoer should not benefit. 
Rather than conferring an advantage upon 
him, doubts should be resolved in favor 
of compensating the injured person for 
his equity. Id. at 808. 
Equity would dictate that the "ten-year rule" is the 
most just measure of damages. Randy's Datsun, supra. 
C. THE MOTION OF THE BANK TO STRIKE MR. STUART'S 
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED. DAMAGES WERE 
AWARDED BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
Appellant argues that Mr. Stuart's testimony should be 
stricken because his opinion is based in part on the unaudited 
financial statements and records of Globe (which were present in 
Court and open to inspection, audit, and/or cross-examination of 
appellant); and the accountant's working papers which were not 
in evidence. 
32 C.J.S. Section 546 (63) at 269-270 recites the fol-
lowing general rules of law: 
(E)xperts may rely on and testify as to 
factual data obtained from others. 
Opinion testimony based in part on reports 
- 33 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of others which are not in evidence but 
which the expert customarily relies upon 
in practice of his profession is admis-
sible. Jenkins v. u. s., 307 F.2d 637, 
641 (1962); Accord, McCormick, Evidence 
Section 15 (1955), 3 Wigmore, Evidence 
Section 688 (3d ed. 1940). 
The Jenkins court also pointed out the "well-known pr: 
tice of psychiatrists of relying upon psychologists' reports in, 
of diagnosis." 
32 C.J.S. Section 546 (85) continues at 269: 
The fact that an expert's judgment is 
not based on all the facts of the case 
has been said to go to its weight rather 
than to its competency. (Citing Dunagan 
v. Appalachian Power Co., 33 F.2d 876 
(1929), cert. denied 50 s.ct. 152, 280 
U. S. 606; Alward v. Paola, 179 P.2d 5, 
9, 79 C. A. 2d l (1947). 
Id. at 270: 
(A)n expert's testimony, although based 
on knowledge gained from inadmissible 
sources, is entitled to credit where it 
has the added sanction of the expert's 
general experience. 
The rule stated immediately above is the well settled 
rule in California. Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corporation, 52 C. · 
2d 86, 125 P.2d 840, 846. 
A careful review of the record shows that Mr. Stuart: 
not base his opinion entirely, or even substantially on the "un· 
audited" financial statements or on the accountant's working par' 
not in evidence. He testified to relying upon Globe's general li 
ger, Globe's books of original entry, all of Globe's basic doc111' 
computer runs from the appellant bank, its bank statements, depc· 
tions, jackets containing miscellaneous papers for each of the' 
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leases in evidence, the accountant's work sheets, exhibits 2P, 17P, 
22P, 26P, 280, BP, 20P, 300, 19P, 7P, 6P, SP, 4P, 24P, Kelly "Blue 
Books", N.A.O.A. "Blue Books", newsletters and handbooks published 
by the automobile industry, various studies of the automobile in-
dustry, etc. (TR. 162-165). 
All of Globe's records were available for inspection by 
appellant (Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). Stuart's 
identity and the materials on which his opinions would be based were 
also available (Rule 26 (b) (4) (A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
The relevance of asserting that Globe's records were "un-
audited" is questionable. It is for the trial court to determine 
their business sufficiency. Defense counsel raised no objection at 
trial as to the "unaudited" status of Globe's financial records. 
Nor does the record reflect that appellant ever, by their own expert, 
challenged the accuracy of these books of account. 
Appellant's objection to Mr. Stuart's testimony being 
based in part on records not in evidence also goes to, in appellant's 
opinion, the trial court's going outside the evidence to render 
judgment. Appellant cites Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines 
Company, 29 Utah 2d 409, 412, 503 P.2d 850, 852 (1972). Park City 
is not on point. In that case the trial court heard the plaintiff's 
expert witnesses, commented on their excellent qualifications and 
testimony then based his judgment on a book unseen by either counsel 
and on a computer program prepared by the judge's student-son whose 
qualifications were never made known. This Court overruled the trial 
court's decision which was apparently based entirely, or almost 
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entirely on information which was not on the record in the face 
of sound expert testimony which was. 
IV. 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT 
SUFFERED $50,000.00 DAMAGES IN LOST PROFIT AFTER 
COUNTERCLAIM LOSSES OFFSETS IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVIDENCE. 
The court below found, "Globe Leasing has been damage' 
by the foregoing acts and the measure is Globe Leasing's loss 0 
profit •.• The Court finds the reasonable amount of lost prof: 
and, therefore, damage is the sum of $50,000.00 after any clak 
offsets of the Bank of Salt Lake including retention by the ~~ 
Salt Lake of the above impounded funds." (Findings of Fact 9 a: 
10 at R. 373). 
It was testified to by Mr. Stuart that in his e~ert 
opinion, damages amounted to $225, 704 (TR. 216). Appellant sur' 
does not dispute that it is within the province of the Court, :: 
without a jury, to mitigate damages by whatever amount it feels 
excessive. The duty of the Court is to factually find to what' 
tent plaintiff was damaged, if any. We know of no rule of law 
any authority which dictates to the trier of fact that he must 
itemize and explain his formula for arriving at that finding. 
court is not required to be that specific. 
Appellant's argument again relies on Legrand Johns~ 
which we pointed out, supra, to be a rather strange case whert 
absolutely !:!£ Findings of Fact were presented. That was the 1 
addressed by the court. Here, the appellant complains that 
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Findings are not enough (emphasis added) . 
Respondent submits without argument that the trial court 
merged any damages arising under any counterclaim of appellant into 
the damage award. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on all the foregoing arguments and the conclusions 
already reached by this Court in setting forth the facts in Globe 
Leasing Corporation v. Bank of Salt Lake, 547 P.2d 197 (1976), the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed including the award 
of damages and dismissal of appellant's counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 1978. 
:~~:S-ROBERT~. McRAE <::: · 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered true and correct copies 
of the foregoing personally to the offices of Van Cott, Bagley, Corn-
wall & McCarthy, 141 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
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and Kipp and Christian, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, as attorneys for appellant, on this 23rd day 
of January, 1978. 
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